In an article posted on 6 January Matt Kennard argues for a serious and comprehensive economic boycott of Israel in response to the recent action is Gaza. He argues that this boycott should extend to economic sanctions of the type imposed on South Africa. In responding to that article, I do not seek to defend Israel’s actions. There should be no doubt that a serious and comprehensive response is needed in reaction to the grossly excessive use of force by Israel. However, the call for the use of economic sanctions needs closer scrutiny.

Intuitively, sanctions appear to be a sensible measure to impose where negotiation and protest have been ineffective. It seems natural that a country would respond to economic losses experienced by the government or a non-negligible proportion of its population. In practice, there is real doubt that sanctions have ever been effective. There is good reason to think that they may do more harm than good.

Sanctions have been used extensively over the last 20 years, particularly by the United States. There are few, if any, examples of where they have brought about the result they were intended to. 45 years of sanctions by the United States against Cuba have produced no change in policy. The sanctions against Iraq didn’t see any change to the leadership under Saddam Hussein, nor did the sanctions against India prevent the development of its nuclear program. Little has changed in the governance of either Iran or Burma despite years of sanctions. Sanctions against Yugoslavia beginning in 1992 did nothing to stop the atrocities there.

Against this, proponents of sanctions offer as example the alleged success of sanctions imposed against apartheid South Africa. This is the example offered by Mr Kennard. It is true that one of the reasons that the apartheid regime collapsed was because of financial difficulties suffered a few years after sanctions were implemented. However, it is not clear that sanctions had anything to do with that result.

The alternate view is that the regime collapsed because of the economic consequences of sustained militant activity by the ANC and the MK. Philip Levy gives a detailed analysis, which I won’t repeat in full here. Briefly, the point made by Mr Levy is that the problem for the South African economy was not sanctions, but a loss of foreign lending on good terms. In support of this he notes that prior to the date on which sanctions were implemented the South African economy was struggling. Yet in the three years following the implementation of sanctions the growth of the economy accelerated. Regime change only occurred years later when the terms of credit available from lenders worsened. That change occurred not because of sanctions, but because private lenders were concerned about civil unrest caused by the ANC and MK.

In any event, whatever conclusion is reached about South Africa, the point remains that sanctions have rarely been effective. To justify using sanctions against Israel it is necessary to show that there is something to differentiate the circumstances of Israel from those of the countries where sanctions have previously failed. I doubt this can be done. There are many reasons why sanctions have failed. I will discuss three that are likely to apply in the case of Israel.

First, a major obstacle to the efficacy of sanctions is that governments generally regard military spending as their highest priority. When sanctions are imposed, it is other aspects of the economy and government which suffer. Education, health and welfare are often reduced, military activity tends to be uninhibited. Vulnerable citizens suffer. For example, Iraq under sanctions was willing to destroy its education system and starve children in order to fund the army. Dennis Halliday, who administered the sanctions on Iraq for the UN, resigned from the job saying:

“I am resigning because the policy of economic sanctions is . . . destroying an entire society. Five thousand children are dying every month. I don’t want to administer a programme that satisfies the definition of genocide.”

Israel would not follow Iraq’s example. Nonetheless, there is reason to fear that if sanctions were imposed the Israeli military would be unimpeded, while civilians suffer. Given that civilian suffering is one of the main complains about Israel’s attack on Gaza, this is hard to justify.

Second, sanctions tend to exacerbate the power difference between those incumbent in government and potential domestic opposition groups. Sanctions often strengthen incumbents and weaken opposition. If it is difficult for the government to raise funds, then it is even harder for those out of government who might seek to impose the incumbents. This makes a change in government, or in government policy, unlikely. The UN Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social rights put it this way:

“{U]nintended consequences [of sanctions] can include reinforcement of the power of oppressive elites, the emergence, almost invariably, of a black market and the generation of huge windfall profits for the privileged elites which manage it, enhancement of the control of the governing elites over the population at large, and restriction of opportunities to seek asylum or to manifest political opposition.”

It is arguable that such a polarization of power and emergence of a black market occurred in Gaza itself as a result of Israel’s blockade, which can be seen as a particularly harsh form of sanction. That exercise did not achieve the change in Hamas policy that it was intended to. If anything, it had the opposite effect. There is reason to fear the same might be true of sanctions on Israel. If there is to be a lasting peace in the Middle East, it will not be achieved by weakening the doves (or potential doves) in the Israeli opposition while strengthening incumbent hawks.

Third, a prerequisite of sanctions working is that the country will respond to it by changing it’s behavior, rather than becoming antagonized. For example, Irananian President Ahmadinejad regularly attempts to use sanctions as a rallying point, portraying sanctions as bullying by other nations. Israel has a long history of regarding itself as a nation under siege. This image is used to justify military activity. It is probable that imposing sanctions would reinforce this belief particularly since, as Mr Kennard notes, the chief cheerleaders at present are the Malaysian and Iranian heads of State, long seen as enemies.

Ultimately, I am sympathetic to Mr Kennard’s desire to take steps to end the Israeli action. If an individual person feels they cannot have a financial contribution of any part of the Israeli economy on their conscience, they should avoid the companies listed by Mr Kennard. However, the proposal for a massive economic boycott needs scrutiny. Careful analysis needs to be done to ensure that sanctions have a reasonable chance of achieving the goals desired, and the price paid is acceptable.

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